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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
THE CITY OF BLANDING,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No. 870604-CA

-vsKIM FAI CHAN and
SOOK WAH CHANf
Defendants and Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did

the Trial Court

err

in failing

to

extend

Constitutional protection to the material alleged to be
pornographic.
II.

Did the Trial Court err in allowing the prosecuting

attorney to testify with respect to material factual details
relating to elements of the offense.
III.

Did the Trial Court err in finding Appellantsf Kim Fai

Chan and Sook Wah Chanf guilty as a matter of fact and law of
distributing pornography in violation of Blanding City Ordinance
13-120413C.
1

IV.

Is

Blanding

City

Ordinance

13-120413

C

unconstitutionally vague in its requirement of a "reasonable
inspection or observation under the circumstances" in order to
impute constructive knowledge of the contents of materials to the
Appellants.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
There are no authorities which Appellant believes to be
directly dispositive of any of the issues of the case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction on October 16,
1987 wherein the Circuit Court found Defendants - Appellants
guilty of distributing pornographic materials in violation of
Blanding City Ordinance 13-120413 C.
Course Of Proceedings Below
Appellants were first tried and convicted of distribution of
pornography in Justice Court in Blanding. (R.l-11)

Appeal was

taken to the Circuit Court in Monticello. (R. 17)
Appellants, Kim Fai Chan and Sook Wah Chan, were charged in
Circuit Court in one Count with renting the video taped movies
"Has Anybody Seen My Pants" and "There Is No Sex Like Snow Sex"
in Blanding, Utah to an adult on May 5, 1986; Appellant, Kim Fai
Chan, was

further

charged

with

renting

the video

movie

"Confessions Of A Young American Housewife" to an adult on June
13, 1986. (R. 115)
The case was tried

to the bench, Honorable Bruce K.

Halliday, Judge presiding, on October 15, and 16, 1987.
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On

October 16, 1987 the Court found Mrs. Chan guilty of the charge
of distributing pornographic materials on May 5, 1986; and Mr.
Chan guilty of distributing pornographic materials on June 13,
1986, but not guilty of distributing pornography on May 5, 1986
(R. 116).

Each was sentenced to a $120 fine and seven days in

jail (R 116).
On or about October 23, 1987, Appellants moved for a new
trial. (R. 106)
The Trial Court denied Appellants1 Motion for a new trial
December 15, 1987 (R. 139) and appeal to this Court was filed
December 24, 1987. (R. 141)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Melvin Laws - Disgruntled Competitor

The Appellants purchased a fast food restaurant in Blanding,
Utah in September, 1985.

(T. Melvin Laws P.14; P.27 L.21-25)

The seller, Melvin Laws, Respondent city's first witness, was
upset by the outcome.
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Now, at first the business was going to be a
restaurant; is that the way you understood it when
you sold it to Mr. Chan?
Correct.
You hadn't anticipated he was going to have a video
business?
Correct
And you were pretty upset when you found out there
was going be another video business right next door
to you; isn't that a fact?
Correct.
Yea. And you had some problems with Mr. Chan; isn't
that a fact?
Correct. (T. P.28 L.11-24)

Over Appellants' counsel's objections to the conclusory
foundational and hearsay nature of the testimony sought, (T.
P.15, 16, 17, 18), Mr. Laws testified,
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The Court: I'm going to allow him to answer.
The Witness: The question again.
Q: (By Mr. Halls) Did you have inquiries... I don't
know what the question was. Did you have any
inquiries in your business... did anybody come to
your business and ask for a particular type of
movie?
A: Yes, I had a number of people come in and say, "Do
you have X-rated movies?" And I said "No." "We
were told that you have them under the counter..."
(T.P.18 L.9-17)
Mr. Laws testified, again over objection, that he received movies
back

from customers belonging to the store of Appellants.

According to Mr. Laws, these mixups were extremely common.

when

asked how many people asked him for these "X-rated"
movies, his testimony was "several dozen". (T.22, L.l-4)
Mr. Laws suffered a memory lapse as to who specifically requested
these movies, but he clearly recalled "several dozens". (T. P.29
L.6-14)
Mr. Law's stated perception that his "reputation was being
ruined by what people thought was going on out of my store, "
moved him, he testified, to complain to the police.

(T.21 P.1-4)

Thereupon the police department of Blanding City launched a
full scale investigation.

A search warrant of Appellants'

business was issued and a number of video tapes confiscated.
39 L.20-23)

(T

None of these confiscated tapes became the subject

of other prosecution, nor were they introduced at trial. (T.40
L.4-7)
B. Count I - May 5, 1985
The basis of the prosecution from which this appeal is taken
arises from the following scenario.
testimony

is undisputed

On or about May 5, 1985, the

that Mike Dayzie, working
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as an

undercover agent for Blanding City, went to Appellants1 business
and rented two movies, Exhibit No."I", "Has Anybody Seen My
Pants" and Exhibit No. " 11" , " Theref s No Sex Like Snow Sex".
(Testimony Michael Dayzie, T. pps. 49, 50, 51)
Both Mr. Dayzie and Appellant, Sook Wah Chan, testified that
she had taken his identification and rented tapes to him on
previous occasions, and that each was known to the other from
prior transactions. (T. pps. 51, 52, 53; Testimony Sook Wah Chan,
T. 112-114).

It is undisputed that Mr. Dayzie requested "party

movies" (T. 50 L.20-23), that Mrs. Chan inquired if Dayzie were
21 because she "didn't want to get in trouble with the cops",
that he responded in the affirmative, (T 51, L. 17-20) and that
she thereupon produced Exhibits "I" and "II" from under a counter
in the store, where they were not in public view (T. 51, L.l).
Mr. Dayzie testified that he was in fact 23 years old (T 53,
L.19-20).

The Court will note upon inspection that Exhibits "I"

and "II" are "non-rated", i.e., they bear no rating of any kind.
The movies were not on display but were kept under the counter
(Dayzie, T. 56, L.20 p.57 L.2).
C.

Count II - June 13, 1986

The second allegation was evidenced in the following manner.
Deputy Sheriff Michael Halliday testified that upon receiving a
complaint

from another person that Appellants were making

available a movie the other person had seen in another place and
where it was rated "X".

So at some point in time, which the

record fails to disclose, Mr. Halliday, rented the video tape
which is Exhibit

"III",

"Confessions of a Young American
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Housewife". (Testimony Michael Halliday, T. P.45)

Exhibit

No."Ill" was displayed upon the shelves of Appellants1 business,
however the evidence is undisputed that it was not where children
could see it; it was high on the upper shelves in order to
prevent youngsters from having access to it.
Q: Okay. For the purposes of the record, you're
reaching your full arms length above your head. Is
that a fair characterization?
A: A pretty high man (inaudible), but another guy,
Austin Lyman, a pretty high, tall person. They had
to reach high to get it. My kids cannot get it.
(Testimony, Kim Fai Chan, T. 106 L.25 P.107 L.5)
Mr. Chan's testimony was clear that he relied 100% on the
"R" rating of EXo"III".

(T. 89, L.15-25) The Court will note

upon inspection of this Exhibit that it is clearly rated "R"
the front cover.

on

Mr. Chan also indicated that he relied upon the

companies which distributed

Exhibits

"I" and "II" which

represented the movies to be within the law and not X-rated, but
because of their adult nature kept them under the counter away
from minors and children. (T. 78, 79, 8 0 ) .

He testified

customers must be over 21 to receive these materials.

(T. 81,

L.19-25) .
D.

Prosecutor Testifies

Because of the unusual circumstance of the prosecutor
taking the witness stand, over counsel's objections, Mr. Halls'
proffer and testimony regarding his conversations with Mr. Chan
are appended hereto as Exhibit "A" and select portions of Mr.
Chan's direct and cross-examination by Mr. Hall are appended as
Exhibit "B".

Also appended are portions of Mr. Hall's closing

argument consisting of certain exchanges with the Court which are
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important to Appellant's claim of error regarding the prosecutor
injecting himself as a witness into the proceedings.

Exhibit

"C" .
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO
TESTIFY AS TO CRITICAL ELEMENTS
OF THE CASE WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR
Mr. Halls' roles as witness and prosecutor became totally
confused and mixed and the Court as trier of fact could not help
and was almost compelled to place greater weight upon the
testimony of Mr. Halls than any other witness, and certainly the
Defendant Kim Fai Chan, regarding whom all of Mr. Halls'
testimony was directed.
If the Court believed the materials Exhibits "I", "II", and
"III", themselves to be obscene within the meaning of the
ordinance, its only alternative was to find the Chans guilty upon
the testimony of Mr. Halls.

Because of this assertion Appellants

request that this Court become familiar with the record as a
whole, which is brief.

Where First Amendment rights are involved

Courts are obliged to make an independent and careful examination
of the record.

Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central

School Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, (C.A.N.Y. 1979) cert, den., 444 U.S.
1081, 100 S.Ct. 1034, 62 L.Ed.2d 765, on rem. 505 F.Supp. 102.
A.

General Rule - Competent Witness

The general rule in litigation is that it is ordinarily
inappropriate for an attorney to testify on behalf of his client
and if the attorney learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer

7

in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his
client, the attorney or his firm must decide whether to serve
either as advocate or as witnesses in the case, based upon the
rules of professional responsibility.
Co. v, American Gym, etc a,

Universal Athletic Sales

546 F.2d 530 (3rd Cir. 1976).

The

lawyer is generally recognized to be competent to testify,
however, he should not do so unless he intends either to
immediately thereafter withdraw, or unless there is evidence of a
compelling

"exceptional

"substantial

hardship"

circumstance" which would
upon

the client.

Absent

work a
special

circumstances, the decision of whether to allow the attorney to
testify is generally considered to be within the sound discretion
of the Trial Court, as well as the decision to require the
attorney to withdraw from the case.
as Witness

See 9 ALR Fed. 500, Attorney

for Client in Federal Case; see also State v.

Williams, 656 P.2d 450, (Utah 1982).
B.

Clear Ethical Violation

That the practice, unless exigent circumstances attend, is
unethical is beyond question.
102, appended hereto.

See Disciplinary Rule 5-101 and

Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of

the Utah State Bar, 1936, as amended, 1985.
Where, as in the case at hand, the prosecutor trying a
criminal case, and absent any extraordinary or compelling reason,
takes the witness stand, not in rebuttal, but in his own case in
chief, and testifies to key elements of the alleged offense,
specifically the Defendant's knowledge, duty and state of mind it
has been held not only to be an impropriety in the extreme, but
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an abuse of the Trial Court's discretion and reversible error.
See generally, 54 ALR 3d 100 Sections 2, 4 and 5; U.S. v.
Robinson, 32 F.2d 505 (8th Cir., 1929); U.S. v. Torres, 503 F.2d
1120 (2nd Cir., 1974); State v. McCuiston, 88 N.M. 94, 537 P.2d
702 (1975); People v. Spencer, 512 P.2d 260, (Colo. 1973); State
v. Hayes, 473 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. 1971); Frank v. State, a 35 N.W.2d
816, (Neb. 1949); Pease v. District Court, 708 P.2d 800,(Colo.
1985).
C.

Trial Court Error

The Court's ruling of December 15, 1987, that there was
"other

substantial

evidence of Kim

Fai Chan's

actual or

constructive knowledge of the contents of the video tapes", is
curious (R. 139).

It would be difficult to point to other

competent evidence of such knowledge absent Mr. Halls' testimony.
It is further curious for the Court to rule that under the
circumstances no "impropriety" occurred.

The Trial Court states

as follows:
That the practice of a prosecuting attorney acting as
such and also as a witness against the Defendant is not
to be preferred but in this case where the prosecutor
is the only prosecutor for the city and was the only
witness with knowledge of the conversation it was not
an abuse of discretion for the Court to allow the
testimony (R.139).
First, the ruling is dehors the record.

There is no testimony

from Mr. Halls or otherwise, that Mr. Halls was the "only
prosecutor

for the city".

It certainly was not a matter

judicially noticed in a manner which would afford defense counsel
an opportunity to be heard as contemplated by Rule 201 U.R.E.
Secondly, the ruling is believed incorrect.
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At the time of

trial, Mr. Halls had been elected San Juan County Attorney, and
certainly another attorney could have been found to try the case
for Blanding City.

Third, defense counsel had absolutely no

notice that Mr. Halls would testify and was totally surprised
when he did.

In answer to Defendants' discovery request, in his

November 6, 1986, letter Mr. Halls indicated that his witnesses
would be Michael Dayzie, Tim Austin and Mike Halliday.

Those

were the witnesses in Justice Court and no indication to the
contrary was ever made.

See Exhibit "D", letter from Craig

Halls, November 6, 1986, Answer to Appellants Discovery Request
as to which witnesses would be called to testify, paragraph 5.
In U.S. v. Torres, 503 F.2d 1120, supra, at 1126 the Court
stated that it was "erroneous to permit (the prosecutor) to
testify

" citing U.S. v. Alu, 246 F.2d

29 (2d Cir. 1957):

"lawyers representing litigants should not be called as witnesses
if such testimony can be avoided consonant with the end of
obtaining justice. . . the Court below was well aware of the
problems that the government was engendering for itself and
indicated that it was up to the government whether it wished to
take the risk of infecting the record with error. . ."
In State v. McCuistion, supra, the State called
prosecutor as a rebuttal witness.

the

He then testified about a

conversation he had had with the Defendant. The statements were
critical to the State's case.

The Court was terse in its

holding:
The Assistant District Attorney argued his
own credibility to the jury. This denied the
Defendant a fair trial.
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In reversing a perjury conviction in People v. Spencer,
supra /

the

Colorado

Supreme

Court,

stating

it

to

be

"inconceivable" that the jury did not take into account that the
prosecutor was convinced

that the Defendant had committed

perjury, found reversible error because he "had thrown his own
weight into the scales against the Defendant."
In State v. Hayes, 473 S.W.2d 688, supra, the Supreme Court
of Missouri reversed a murder conviction stating at 691:
A prosecuting attorney is not incompetent to
be a witness and the Trial Court may exercise
discretion in determining to what extent and
to what matters he may be permitted to
testify.
However, the general and uniform
rule is that the right of a prosecutor to
testify in a criminal case "is strictly
limited to those instances where his
testimony is made necessary by the peculiar
and unusual circumstances of the case. Even
then, his functions as a prosecutor and as a
witness should be disassociated.
If he is
aware, prior to trial, that he will be a
necessary witness, or if he discovers this
fact during the course of trial, he should
withdraw and have other counsel try to the
case. (Numerous citations omitted). . . As a
public official "in whom the public has
reposed confidence, his evidence is
ordinarily given greater weight than that of
an ordinary witness, and the natural tendency
is for the Defendant to question the fairness
of a trial when the prosecutor becomes a
witness for the State. Therefore, he should,
when that becomes necessary, so conduct
himself as to foster and demonstrate the fact
that he is not actively participating as a
prosecutor but only as a witness, truthfully
and impartially giving competent testimony.
A significant impairment of First Amendment rights such as
involved in this case must survive exacting scrutiny.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d

Elrod v.

547 (1976).

Appellants assert that upon a review of the record as a whole
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with "exacting scrutiny", the Court will be convinced that is
"inconceivable" that the trier of fact did not take into account
that the prosecutor was convinced of the Chans1 guilt and "had
thrown his own weight into the scales" against the Defendants.
People v. Spencer, supra.
The prosecutor's testimony was absolutely critical to a
conviction of Mr. Chan and the circumstances warrant reversal and
a new trial.

Mr. Hall's closing argument consisted

to a

significant extent of discussion with the Court which was
testimonial in nature.

He clearly argued his own credibility and

Defendant's were denied a fair trial as a result.
D.

Prior Restraint - Immunity - Suppression

Mr. Halls actions

in and of themselves, to which he

testified, constituted censorship of a most egregious variety.
See Exhibit "A", "B", and "C".

The invidious system of prior

restraint imposed by Mr. Halls, amounting to a conditional grant
of immunity should not be sanctioned by this Court.

See Council

for Periodical Distributors Ass'n. v. Evans, 642 F.Supp. 552
(M.D. Ala 1986).

As victims of this illegal prior restraint

Appellants should be entitled to a new trial wherein Mr. Hall's
testimony

is suppressed

in order to achieve a measure of

prevention of this conduct in the future.
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POINT II
THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF
"KNOWINGLY" INCORPORATED INTO BLANDING CITY
ORDINANCE 13-120413 C IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
VAGUE, OVERBROAD AND INDEFINITE.
A.
Kim

To Review or Not To Review

Fai Chan was convicted

information,

(R.116) alleging

only of Count
distribution

"Confessions Of A Young American Housewife"

II of the

of

the

tape

on June 13, 1987.

Mr. Chan testified that he had never seen or reviewed the
video.

Again

the question of the weight

credibility comes into play.

of Mr. Hall's

Ignoring that fact, however, for

the purpose of this point, note the following exchange:
Q:

You indicated to him (Mr. Halls) that you would
review the R-rated movies?
A: No, Never.
Q: This movie, "Confessions of an American Housewife",
is this one that you viewed prior to June 13th?
A: No. This has a rated "R" on it. I have job at that
time. There's a rated "R" symbol on that box.
(T. 89 L.15-22)
B.

Does Knowingly Mean Knowingly

The ordinance indicates that in order to be convicted of the
crime of

"distributing

pornography", inter alia, that the

distribution occur "knowingly".

That particular word is defined

for use solely in the context of the framework set forth in Part
12 of Title 76 Chapter 10, dealing with pornographic and obscene
materials.

This is the framework which must apply to the

Blanding City Ordinance if its ordinance is to be a proper
Constitutional exercise of municipal authority. Nasfell v. Ogden,
249 P.2d 507 (Utah 1952).
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The definition goes beyond the customary definition of
"knowingly" embodied generally within Chapter two of the Criminal
Code, Principles of Criminal Responsibility, 76-2-103(2) U.C.A.
A special "pornography"

definition of "knowingly" is separately

stated:
(4) "Knowingly" means an awareness, whether actual or
constructive of the character of material or of a
performance. A person has constructive knowledge if a
reasonable inspection or observation under the
circumstances would have disclosed the nature of the
subject matter and if a failure to inspect or observe
is either for the purpose of avoiding disclosure or is
criminally negligent. 76-10-1201 U.C.A.
This special definition leaves much to the imagination. What
is a video tape lessor or vendor supposed to do in order to
satisfy

the

requirement

of

a

"reasonable

observation under the circumstances"?
label

of

a movie

inspection"?

rated

"R",

inspection

or

If the purveyor reads the

is that

not

a

"reasonable

Why does that inspection not create a reasonable

presumption that the materials contained within are appropriate
for adult consumption?
"R" rated tape?
C.

Must the lessor or vendor preview every

Is that not a "prior restraint"?
Objective Standards - Vagueness

Since the statute sets forth no known objective standard
against which to test and measure the "reasonableness of the
inspection", the statute is vague as applied.

"No one at peril

of life, liberty or property may be required to speculate as to
the meaning of penal statutes.

All are entitled to be informed

of what the State commands and forbids."
306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
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Lanzetta v. New Jersey,

Quoting from Connally v. General Construction Company, 269
U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322, the Utah Supreme Court
has stated that "a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application violates the first essentials of due process of law.
State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 561, 563, (Utah 1953).

The Court

further explained,
...there is no disagreement among the Courts that where
a rule is set up, the violation of which subjects one
to criminal punishment, the restrictions upon conduct
should be described with sufficient certainty, so that
persons of ordinary intelligence, desiring to obey the
law, may know how to govern themselves in conformity
with it and that no one should be compelled at the
peril of life, liberty or property, to speculate as to
the meaning of penal statutes.
Concerning the question of uncertainty or vagueness of
statues, the authorities seem to be in accord that the
test a statute must meet to be valid is: It must be
sufficiently definite (a) to inform persons of ordinary
intelligence, who would be law abiding, what their
conduct must be to conform to its requirements; (b) to
advise a defendant accused of violating it just what
constitutes the offense with which he is charged, and
(c) to be susceptible of uniform interpretation and
application by those charged with the responsibility of
applying and enforcing it. Packard, 250 P.2d at 564.
Other Utah cases embracing these principles are Greaves v.
State, 528 P.2d 805, 807 (1974);

State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182,

1883 (1981); and State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986).
See also Papachriston v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92
S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972);

Smith v.

Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L. Ed.2d 605 (1973);

See

also U.S. v. Howard, 655 F.Supp. 392, 398, 399 (N.D. Ga. 1987)
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The fundamental

problem i n the c a s e

before

t h e Court

is

the

following:
...where a rule exacting punishment is made to depend
on a test or matters as to which there may be an honest
difference of opinion, it is too indefinite and
uncertain to be enforced....
C.J.S., Criminal Law §
24(2) pps 69, 70.
As stated in Grayned v. City of Rockford,
uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to steer
far wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries
of the forbidden areas were clearly marked. 33 L.Ed.2d
at 228 (Citations omitted).
Reasonable persons could perhaps differ in their opinion as
to whether Mr. or Mrs. Chan made a "reasonable inspection".

In

this particular context that terminology invites speculation.
The chilling effect of affirming the Trial Court's opinion that
the Chans failed to make a reasonable inspection would be
devastating

to First Amendment

freedoms and the ideal of

uninhibited free flow of ideas in the market place of discussion
in the area of this particular media, i.e., video tape movies.
Appellants assert that the definition is overbroad and void
on its face, because there is no limiting construction which
could save the statute without judicially rewriting it.

See

Community Television v. Wilkinson, 611 F.Supp. 1099 (D. Utah
1985), aff'd 800 F.2d 989; Home Box Office Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531
F.Supp.

986

(1982).

Furthermore it penalizes the viewer,

consumers of the media, whose rights are paramount.

See Red Lion

Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 1794, L.Ed.2d
(1969).
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It is well to recall Chief Justice Warren's remarks in his
concurring opinion in U.S. v. Roth,, ante:
The line dividing the salacious or pornographic from
literature or science is not straight and unwavering*
Present laws depend largely upon the effect that these
materials have on those who receive them. ...but there
is more to these cases. It is not the book that is on
trial; it is a person. The conduct of the Defendant is
the central issue, not the obscenity of a book or
picture. Roth, 1 L.Ed2d 1498, at 1513.
Mr. and Mrs. Chan did all that could reasonably have been
anticipated of them.

To hold them to a higher standard is

violative of their due process rights.

Even if they did not do

all they should have, the statute is no less vague and should be
declared unconstitutional.
POINT III
THE MATERIALS ARE NOT
CONSTITUTIONALLY UNPROTECTED OBSCENITY
None of the Exhibits "I", "11" or "III" are "hardcore
obscenity" as required for a successful pornography prosecution.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 7 L.Ed 2d 419
(1983), reh. den.

414 U.S. 881, 94 S.Ct. 26, 38 L.Ed 2d 128.

The Utah Statute and Blanding City Ordinance essentially parrot
the requirements set forth in Miller v. California, ante; see
State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837 (Utah 1978).
A. Independent Appellate Review
In order to arrive at the determination of whether the
materials are constitutionally unprotected obscenity the scope of
this Court's review is global.
...Where the trier of facts has determined the question
of obscenity in the context of constitutional
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guaranties of freedom of speech and press, an Appellate
Court is not bound by the conclusions of the Lower
Courts or of juries but will re-examine the evidential
basis on which those conclusions are founded.
This
rule applies to findings in the Lower Federal Courts as
well as to findings of State Courts.... 50 Am. Jur. 2d,
Lewdness, Indecency, Etc., § 42 Appellate Review,
scope. P.495.
In other words, this Court must review the tapes and make
independent determination whether the materials are entitled to
constitutional protection or are "hardcore".

See for example

Haldeman v. U.S., 340 F.2d 59 (10 Cir. 1965), holding sexually
explicit materials including nudity not to be obscene, wherein
the Court observes that "what is obscene and beyond the scope of
constitutional

protection is ultimately

determine as a matter of law".

for the Courts to

340 F.2d at 61. As stated by the

United States Supreme Court:
Hence, we reaffirm the principle that in "obscenity"
cases as in all others involving rights derived from
the First Amendment guarantees of free expression, this
Court cannot avoid making an independent Consitutional
Judgment on the facts of the case as to whether the
material involved is constitutionally protected.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, at 190, 84 S.Ct. 1676
at 1679 (1964).
B. Sight Test
After this Court has reviewed the materials it must make the
requisite determinations set forth in Miller v. California, ante;
and 76-101202 U.C.A.
oft quoted

However, the answer still comes down to the

"I know it when I see it" test first posited by

Justice Potter Stewart in his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v.
Ohio, supra, 378 U.S. at 197, 84 S.Ct. at 1683:
I have reached the conclusion, which I think is
confirmed at least by negative implication in the
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Court's decisions since Roth and Alberts, that under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in
this area are constitutionally limited to hard-core
pornography.
I shall not today attempt further to
define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps
I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I
know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved
in this case is not that.
On the same day he concurred in A Quantity of Books v. Kansas,
378 U.S. 205, at 214, 84 S.Ct. 1752, 12 L.Ed2d 809 (1964), that
the

books

were

not

"hard

core"

pornography

and

therefore

"...Kansas could not by any procedure constitutionally suppress
them...."
C.

Central Question - Is It "Hardcore"

This is the test which has been adopted in the United States
and in Utah.
Haig,

supra;

See Justice Maughn's concurring opinion in State v.
and

California, supra.

Justice

Burger's

decision

As Justice Renquist

stated

U.S., 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590

in

Miller

v.

in Hamling v.
(1974), quoting

first from U.S. v 12 200 ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 37, 93
S.Ct. 2665, L.Ed.2d 500

(1973).

"We further note that, while we must leave to State
Courts the construction of state legislation, we do
have a duty to authoritatively construe Federal
statutes where a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised and "a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided."
United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S.
363, 369 28 L.Ed. 2d 822, 91 S.Ct. 1400 (1971) (opinion
of White, J.) quoting from Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 62, 76 L.Ed. 598, 52 S.Ct. 285 (1932). If and when
such a serious doubt is raised as to the vagueness of
the words obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent,
or immoral as used to describe regulated material in 19
U.S.C. § 1305(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 1462 19 U.S.C.S. §
1305(a) and 18 U.S.C.S. § 1462, see United States v.
Orito, 413 U.S. at 140 n 1, 37 L.Ed.2d 513, we are
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prepared to construe such terms as limiting regulated
material to patently offensive representations or
descriptions of that specific hard core sexual conduct
given as examples in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at
25, 37 L.Ed.2d 419. See United States v. Thirty-seven
Photographs, supra at 369-374, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (opinion
of White, J.). Of course, Congress could always define
other specific hard core "conduct." 413 U.S. at 130 n
7, 37 L.Ed.2d 500.
Miller undertook to set forth examples of the types of
material which a statute might proscribe as portraying
sexual conduct in a patently sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way, 413 U.S. at 25-26, 37 L.Ed.2d
419, and went on to say that no one could be prosecuted
for the "sale or exposure of obscene materials unless
these materials depict or describe patently offensive
hard core sexual conduct specifically defined by the
regulating state law, as written or construed." Id.,
at 27, 37 L.Ed.2d 419. As noted above, we indicated in
United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, supra, at
130 n 7, 37 L.Ed. 2d 500, that we were prepared to
construe the generic terms in 18 U.S.C. § 1462, 18
U.SoC.S. § 1462 to be limited to the sort of "patently
offensive representation or description of the specific
hard core sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v.
California."
Hamling v. U.S., 41 L.Ed.2d at 618
(Emphasis Supplied).
Consequently, one must in an overall consideration of the
law make the determination whether the materials, Exhibits "I",
"II", and "III", alleged to be obscene are so in such a fashion
that one must characterize them as "hard core".

Appellants

submit that some might deem these Exhibits to be ribald classics.
Certainly, however, none could be said to be
pornography.

"hard core"

There are no genitals observed, no penetration

visible, no vivid, lurid gynecological and other such details of
the type one normally associates with "hard core" pornography.
There is much left to the imagination.
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P. Sex Is Not Obscenity
The

Trial

Court

felt

that

depictions

necessarily rendered these works obscene.
incorrect.

of

sex

acts

That determination is

The line between a video version of "Tropic of

Cancer", analogous to Exhibit "III", "Confessions Of A Young
American Housewife", puerile though it may be, and the unrelieved
smut and filth of the "hardcore" "Deep Throat" or "Behind the
Green Door", is not a difficult one to draw.
simply not "hardcore obscenity".

Exhibit III is

Even less so are Exhibits "I",

"II".
The determination is not whether the material is acceptable
to oneself. The critical question is whether it is material which
one will tolerate for viewing by someone else.

Of the latter

examples, e.g., "Deep Throat" one might reasonably conclude that
no one in the community should be allowed to observe.

Exhibits

"I", "II", and "III", however, are not so patently offensive or
"hardcore" that the right of censorship should be allowed.
have serious, humorous, and legitimate entertainment value.

They
To

some they might be deemed quite artful.
In an atmosphere of repression, as is argued to exist in
Utah, the course of wisdom may well be to give a freeing hand to
those materials and ideas which serve as a release valve by which
to allow the pressure to escape in innocuous and harmless
fashion.

The viewing of the materials before the Court in this

case may be just such a necessary palliative.

The United States

Supreme Court has stated its view in the following fashion:
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Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life,
has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest
to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital
problems of human interest and public concern. As to
all such problems, this Court said in Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.So 88, 101, 102, 84 L.Ed. 1093, 1102, 60
S.Ct. 736:
"The freedom of speech and of the press
guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least
the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all
matters of public concern without previous restraint or
fear of subsequent punishment. The exigencies of the
colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom from
oppressive administration developed a broadened
conception of these liberties as adequate to supply the
public need for information and education with respect
to the significant issues of the times.... Freedom of
discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function
in this nation, must embrace all issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies for
their period."
Roth v. U.S., 354 U.Sc 476, 1 L.Ed.2d
1498 at 1509, 77 S.Ct. 1304 (1957)* (Emphasis added.)
"Sex and obscenity are not synonymous."

Roth at 1509.

The fact

that these materials are decidedly sexual in nature does not
abrogate all Constitutional protection.

Sex is a "significant

issue of the times".
E. Average Person - Community Standards
General Discussion
Judgment

regarding

"contemporary

community standards",

whatever that phrase means, must be made in the context of the
"average person's" opinion.

The "average person" is, of course,

not synonymous with the "reasonable person".

The "average

person" takes in all extremes of society as well as those from
the middle of the road, both reasonable, unreasonable, perverse
and not so perverse.

The material's effect must neither be

judged on the basis of a particularly sensitive nor insensitive
group or person*

See Hamling v. U.S., supra, at 41 L.£do2d 615.
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According to the testimony of Mr, Laws, "numerous dozens" of
persons found these types of videos to be to their taste, (T.22,
L.l-4; T.29, L.6-14) so one might conclude that they are well
within what the "average person" applying "contemporary community
standards" finds acceptable in Blanding and parts thereabout, the
"vicinage".
This "average person" standard also applies to the questions
of prurient interest and patent offensiveness, the first and
second prongs of the Miller test.
F. Reasonable Person
As to the question, however, of whether the work, taken as a
whole, "has serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value, " however, the thoughts of the

"average person" or

"community standard" are not relevant.

These values are held not

to vary from community to community.

The "reasonable person"

standard is used to determine the third prong of the Miller test.
Pope v. Illinois, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987).
G. Pandering
As suggested
pandering, of

in Miller v. California, the question of

"thrusting"

sexually

explicit

materials by

"aggressive sales tactics" upon recipients having no desire to
receive them is also relevant to the obscenity inquiry:
...States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting
discrimination or - exhibition of obscene material when
the mode of discrimination carries with it a
significant danger of offending the sensibilities of
unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles.
Miller at 37 L.Ed.2d 427.
Obviously from a review of the record this issue presents no
problem in this case.

Pandering or risk of exposure to minors or
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the otherwise unwilling is completely anathema to the state of
the evidence before this Court.
H.

The Statute - The Standards

The questions before this Court under Miller and the
ordinance are threefold:
(1).

Does the average person, applying contemporary

community standards, find that, taken as a whole, the
material appeals to prurient interest in sex;
(2).

Is it patently offensive in the description or

depiction of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement,
sado-masochistic abuse, or excretion; and
(3).

Taken as a whole must a reasonable person find

that it does not have serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value.
The Respondent cannot convince this Court, that the "average
person" applying "contemporary community standards" would agree
that these materials appeal to a prurient interest in sex; nor
that a reasonable person applying objective standards must find
that it lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value.

Most important it cannot demonstrate that this material

is "patently offensive" in its depictions of sex and nudity.
ideas

conjured,

the philosophies

espoused,

the

The

concepts

engendered, may well be offensive and loathsome in the extreme.
But the First Amendment exists to protect such ideas and concepts
most of all.

The depictions themselves, are vague, brief, non-

explicit, and relatively innocuous.
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The depictions are not

"patently offensive".

This is simply not "hard core" pornography

as contemplated by the authorities:
Under the holdings announced todayy no one will be
subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of
obscene materials unless these materials depict or
describe patently offensive "hard core" sexual conduct
specifically defined by the regulating state law, as
written or construed. Miller v. Californiaf 37 L.Ed.2d
at 432. (Emphasis added)
CONCLUSION
This prosecution should be remanded with directions for the
Trial Court to enter a Judgment of Dismissal on all counts.

DATED this

day of June, 1988.

Herschel Bullen
McDonald and Bullen

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of June, 1988, I

caused to be served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellants by placing said copy in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Craig C. Halls
73 South Main Street
Blanding, UT 84511
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1

Q

And you now wish to change your testimony?

2

A

There's -- When we went over with the Search

Warrant, we got 20-plus tapes.

3
4

0

Just answer my question.

5

A

Well, I'm trying to, sir.

6

Q

Do you want to change your testimony?

7

A

No, sir.

8

2

Did you get four tapes from Mr. Dayzie on May

A

I'm uncertain as to whether we got four or two.

Q

You don't know whether you got four or two from

5th?

9
10
!

Mr- Dayzie?
13

A

I know that we got those two for sure.

14

Q

Do you recall his testimony at trial?

15

A

No, I don't.

16

Q

And do you recall that he testified that he got-H

17

that he purchased four?

18

A

I don't recall that.

19

Q

Until I confronted him with a receipt?

20

A

I don't recall that.

21

MR. BULLEN:

I have nothing further.

22

THE COURT:

You may step down.

23

MR. HALLS:

Nothing further.

Your Honor,

24

at this time I'm not sure how this is going to work out,
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but I'd like to call myself as a witness.
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MR. BULLEN: That's a bit unusual, Mr. Halls.
THE COURT:

Are you going to examine your-

MR. HALLS:

Ifm going to proffer some testi-

self?

mony and let you cross-examine me.
THE COURT:

Why don't you make a proffer

of what your testimony is going to be, Mr. Halls, and we'll
see what kind of an objection counsel might have.
MR. HALLS:

Your Honor, after these initial

two movies were confiscated by the police, Mr. Kim Fai Chan
came to my office and we had a discussion for approximately
a half an hour with regard to what he would do in policing
himself and these types of movies.
regard to those conversations.

I would testify with

Essentially my conversations

with Mr. Chan in.regard to whether we were going to bring
any charges on these movies and so on.
THE COURT:
MR. BULLEN:

Is that going to be an issue?
Well, I don't think it has any

relevance.
MR. HALLS:

There's a part of that, Your

Honor, that indicates -- where Mr. Chan indicated to me that
he viewed all of these non-rated movies personally.

He also

assured me that he would view any movies in the future personally to make sure that they were all fit for viewing.
I think that goes to his scienter, his knowledge, his

62

1

constructive knowledge of whether or not he was put on know

2

ledge that that's something that he should do.

3
4

THE COURT:

This was after these first two

were confiscated; is that correct?

5

MR- HALLS:

Yes.

6

THE COURT:

Will your testimony be to the

7

effect that he was going to do that with regard to these

8

two or was he going to do this into the future?

9

MR. HALLS:

He would do that -- These movies

10

had already been confiscated and expressed to him as being,

11

along with two or three other movies that were confiscated

12

by virtue of the Search Warrant, that these were not accept-

13

able movies.

14

to purchase non-rated movies, adult viewing movies, but that

15

he previewed them all before he put them on the shelf to

16

determine whether their content was objectionable or not.

17

And he indicated to me that that was his practice and also

18

that he would do that in the future to ensure that none of

19

these movies would -- He also indicated that any movie --

20

and I think he named a couple of titles; one of the ones

21

I remember was a Playboy movie that even if it were rated,

22

if it had a suggestive cover, that he viewed those also to

23

determine content.

24

ledge or his constructive knowledge of the contents of thes^

25

films and these types of films.

And he indicated that it had been his practicej

I think that is pertinent to his know-
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MR. BULLEN:
able.

I think it's extremely objectiofi

At this point in time an attorney that's trying a

3 j case, to put his own credibility and candor into issue befor£
4

the Court, I think it's down right unethical to do that.

5

And it puts me in a very difficult position because I feel

6

that Mr. Halls has made some misstatements to the Court pre-

7

viously about some conversations that he and I had, and I

8

don't want to get into that ballgame with you.

9

think it's —

And I just

For him not to have made arrangements for some

10

body else to try this case so that he could go ahead and

11

be a witness freely without an unfettered -- you know, with-

12

out any fear of running into this kind of problem, I think

13

it's improper and objectionable.

14

that he's making, but I think it's improper for him to put

15

himself in that position.

16

MR. HALLS:

I understand the point

Well, Your Honor, if I thought

17

that this was improper or if I thought that this was mal-

18

practice, or if I thought that this was objectionable from

19

that standpoint, I wouldn't propose to do it.

I don't find

20

anything unethical about what I propose to do.

Mr. Kim Fai

21

Chan came into my office with regard to his future activity

22

and how he would police himself with regard to this very

23

issue.

24

the case, but I don't see anything unethical in me proffer-

25

ing testimony and giving Mr. Bullen an opportunity to reach

Perhaps I should have gotten someone else to try
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1

an understanding on how I feel about what I was told and

2

what our conversation was.

3

MR. BULLEN:

4

THE COURT:

5

I submit it.
Step forward and be sworn, Mr.

Halls.

5

(Whereupon Craig C. Halls,
being first duly sworn, testi
fied as follows:)

7
8
9
10

DIRECT STATEMENT
BY MR. HALLS:
In approximately May of 1986, the movies that are listed

11

here as Exhibit No. 1 and Exhibit No. 2 were confiscated

12

by the Police Department.

13

City Attorney that they may be prosecuted.

14

came to my office for the purpose of talking to me and

15

essentially pleading with me to make a different arrangement

16

than to prosecute.

17

only people in the office.

18

that these were adult viewing type movies; that he spent

19

considerable time viewing these movies prior to putting them)

20

on the shelf.

21

"questionable" is not the word -- he indicated to me that

22

the covers that were suggestive, he also viewed those moviesj

23

And it came to my attention as

He made —

Mr. Kim Fai Chan]

Mr. Chan and myself were the

He indicated to me at that time

And he indicated to me that the questionable-}"

And based upon his assertions that he would preview

24

all of these movies f I indicated to him that we would hold

25

in abeyance the prosecution of these movies, provided he
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1

didn't have any other problems.

2

him that we would hold the movies -- I told him that we woul{5

3

hold the movies, and if he didn't have any further problems

4

with this type of material, that he was going to take care

5

of himself, that we would not prosecute those.

6

to him at the time that if he did have further problems,

7

we would feel free to bring these movies back in and prosecujte

8

on them.

9

That's the reason why

10

MR. BULLEN:

11
12
13

I indicated

—
I'll object to what the reason

is.
DIRECT STATEMENT (Continued)
with it.

14

I believe that was
MR. BULLEN:

I'll object to anything but

the substance of the conversation.

16

DIRECT STATEMENT (Continued)
May 5th.

We had no other problems|

—

15

17

So we essentially told

That was approximately

The other movie came to our attention in June.

18

THE COURT:

Anything further, Mr. Halls?

19

MR. HALLS:

No.

20

THE COURT:

Do you want to cross-examine?

21 I

MR. BULLEN:

in

MR. HALLS:

We have nothing further, Your

THE COURT:

You're not going to offer the

I have no cross.

23 I Honor.
24
25

exhibits for me to watch?
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1

MR. HALLS:

Well, Your Honor, I think we ought

2

to limit this to the problem; not to what his impression of

3

what Mr. Laws might be trying to do or not do.

4

him explain.

I don't think that's responsive to the questio|i.

5
6

THE COURT:

MR. BULLEN:
draw that question.

9
10

Can you kind of lead him along

a little bit?

7
8

Just have

Q

No, I can't.

I'm going to with

I'll try to reapproach it at a later tijne

(By Mr. Bullen)

Let me ask you:

Have you ever

received an X-rated movie from any of the companies?

11

A

Yes, one time.

12

Q

And it had an actual "X" on the movie?

13

A

It did actually have an "X" on them.

14

Q

What did you -- What did you do with that movie?

15

A

And I didn't know that.

It's usually that is

16

impossible those available, so I saw it when I come home

17

after work.

18

back and tell them about it.

And I saw it.

I hurry up and call the company

19

Q

What company was that?

20

A

It's a Vicon in Salt Lake City.

21

Q

Um-hum.

22

A

And they also surprised.

23

And what did you do with that tape?
And then they asked

me to send it back.

24

Q

All right.

25

A

Yes.

Did you send it back?
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B

1

0

Is that they only one you've ever received?

">

A

Yes.

3

Q

What was the name of that one?

4

A

"The Story of Olga."

5

0

Do you recall, Mr. Chan, a conversation that you 1

6

had with Craig Halls after May 5th?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Of 1986?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Did you have a discussion with him with regard

11

to cutting -- Before I forget, do you have some Playboy

12

movies and things like that come in from time to time?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

What are they rated?

15

A

They are rated R, but they don't have any rating 1

16

symbol on the copy at all (inaudible).

17
18

Q

No rating on the box

Well, then how do you know they're rated R? What

do you mean they're rated R?
I call up those companies and call up and talk

19

A

20

to my dealer.

21

Playboy?"

22

is the one company in Salt Lake.

23

Salt Lake.

24

there's no rating on the box."

25

R."

And I say, What are — Are they rated X,

They say, "No, this is rated R."

And at Vicon

It's the major company in

They give me the information.

And I said, "But

They said, "They are rated

And then I depend on that information.
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j

Q

Was this after May 5th?

2

A

No.

4

Q

Okay.

5

A

That what I understand.

3

5

stand.

That is my policy on

my business.

7
g

When I start business, that's what I under-

Q

All right.

Did you have an understanding with

regard to these tapes?

9

A

Yes.

They are unrated, and then I call up to

10

them (inaudible), those companies that sold it to me.

11

say, "Are they X-rated?,f

12

or not rated.

13

It's a lot of movies is unrated, not rated.

14

any kind unrated, not rated.

15

"Are they legal?"

16

forgot if it's Texas or Oklahoma, somewhere, that company.

17

They say, "No, they are not X-rated."

18

X-rated movie are not allowed in Texas.

19

it --

"They are not."

There's a lot of movies.

They are unrated

Not only these kind]
They could be

They are not X-rated.

I call up to Texas, their company.

20

Q

Not allowed?

21

A

Not allowed.

22

Q

As in Utah?

23

A

As in Utah.

I

I say,
I

We have the same.
They are not allowejd

Is that what you're saying?

We have the same law as Utah.

24

MR. HALLS:

Your Honor

25

THE WITNESS:

—

And you cannot get X-rated mo^ie,
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1

MR. HALLS:

Your Honor, I'll object and ask

2

that that be stricken.

3

whether Texas has the same law as Utah.

4
5

MR. BULLEN:

THE COURT:

Well, I'll let it in.

It's hear

say, but --

8

MR. BULLEN:

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. BULLEN:

11

No, but it goes directly to

his (inaudible).

6

7

I don't think that Mr. Chan knows

Q

(By Mr. Bullen)

12

May 5th a little bit.

13

with Craig Halls?

But it's not admitted for -No.
(Inaudible)
Mr. Chan, let's go forward from

Do you recall having a conversation

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

Do you recall having a discussion during that

16

period with regard to what your practice was going to be

17

in the future?

18

A

19
20

MR. HALLS:

23
24
25

(Inaudible) leading.

I want

to hear what his testimony is.

21
22

Yes.

MR. BULLEN:
Q

(By Mr. Bullen)

Okay.

All right.

If you will, remember the sub-

stance of that conversation and relate it to the Judge.
A

I, urn -- After the first time.

Is it May that

you're referring?
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1

Q

Yes.

2

A

April or May?

3

Q

May.

4

A

May, okay.

The first time is May.

5

After that I went into Craig Halls ! s office.

6

versation about, urn, how is that movie?

7

the policy of the community

8
9

Q

And then I-We have a con-

I want to find out

—

Just relate the conversation.

What did you say?

What did he say?

10

A

He -- I —

11

Q

Both.

12

A

He -- He —

He say or I say?

The conversation.

Both.

He said that he -- He say —

Okay.

13

In general, he said, urn -- you ask me to view -- it's not

14

quoting, okay?

15

unrated movie and not rated movie.

16

the unrated and not rated movie as much as I can (inaudible)

17
18

Q

It's too long ago.

He ask me to view the
And I -- I will to view

Well, I think you understand, but for the purpose)

of the record, the word you're using, is it "view?"

19

A

View.

20

Q

All right.

A

He didn't say he would drop the chages.

21
22

V-i-e-w.
Is there anything further that he

said?

23

didn't have any -- it's not agreement.

24

He didn't say a lot of things.

25

say that the policy of the da, da, da, da.

He

I think that's all.

And he read up from a book
He just keep
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reading it.

I says, "Mr. Hall, I just come here to want

to find out if they are not X-rated, they are rated, I call
up the company.

They are unrated, and I didn't know that

4 j they -- I call up the company.
5

I call up the company before

I (inaudible) they are not X-rated."

6 j to -- my situation to him.

He keep reading a book from the

City ordinance, something like that.
8 I I say, "I understand*
9

know —

will in the future —
not rated movie."
13 I at all.

But it is a long one.

Mr. Hall, I want -- I just want to

I want to cooperate.

10 I They are not X-rated,

And I try to explain

You can drop the charges, okay

You can drop the charges.

Then I

and will be responsible to unrated and

And he didn't -- It's not our agreement

He didn't drop the charges.

He will look into it,

14 I and he never got back to me (inaudible).
Q

You indicated to him that you would review the

16 I R-rated movies?
17

A

No, never.

18

Q

This movie, "Confessions of an American Housewife]

19
20

is this one that you viewed prior to June 13th?
A

21 j that time.

No.

This has a rated R on it.

I have job at

There's a rated R symbol on that box.

I rely

hundred percent on that rating on that box.
23 I

Q

To your knowledge, has your wife ever seen any

24 I of these movies?
A

She never seen that up to this moment.
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1

A

Urn, responsible? What dc you mean by responsible?!

2

Q

Who's responsible?

3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10

Who decides if that goes on

the shelf?
A

Of course, owner of the — of course, whoever is

(inaudible) that is legal according to law put that on shelfj
Q

You really -- What you*re saying is you, as the

owner, has the responsibility?
A

I think the owner has the (inaudible) whoever

went in that store knows that that is legal and put it on
the shelf•

11

Q

Yes

12

A

X-rated, I won't.

13

Q

And it's not the responsibility of the City policje

-

14

men to come and look at all your movies to decide whether

15

it violates the statute, is it?

16
17

MR. BULLEN:

assuming facts not in evidence.

18
19
20

Well, I'll object to it as

THE COURT:

And I think it's argumentative,

Mr. Halls.
Q

(By Mr. Halls)

Do you recall a -- You've testi-

21

fied about a conversation that you had with me in my office,]

22

and I've testified with regard to —

23

to some of that.

24

that you indicated to me —

25

a comment that you viewed all of these non-rated movies

briefly with regard

Do you remember when you came to my offied
Do you remember giving —

saying
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1

before you put them on there and you promised that you wouldj

2

continue to do that in the future?

3

stayed up late at night watching each of these, did you not?j

4
5
6

A

Your conversation is not that, Mr. Hall.

Q

Well, I want you -- I want you to tell me whether]

you remember what I just asked you.

8

me that?

10
11

Do you

want me to rephrase it one more time?

7

9

You indicated that you

A

Do you remember tellingj

I remember the other thing you said but not rememj-

ber what you just said,
Q

And do you remember that you wanted me to tell

12

you what was pornographic or what was not, and that's why

13

I read to you from the statute?

14

A

You told me —

15

to set —

16

That is legal.

You told me —

I want to go insidej

to settle with this (inaudible), Mr. Hall, t h a t —
I call up the company before I rent it.

17

Q

I'm not --

18

A

(Continued) —

That's what I say.

That's what

19

I remember.

20

community of view, then I will rate it.

21

view that, those movies, unrated, not rated, in the future,

22

but not rated R.

23

R movie.

24
25

Q

And if I was you (inaudible) concern of the
I will view, v-i-e-|w,

I never promised to view all the rated

It is impossible.
Do you remember me telling you that you had the

responsibility, as the owner, to censor your own movies?

100

j

A

I cannot recall you say that.

I only recall--

2

you never give me agreement and you never give me any --

3

any -- You never give me any agreement on that.

4

Q

Do you remember --

5

A

(Inaudible) that is different thing.

6

Q

Do you remember me telling you that I couldn't

7

tell you what the requirements were and I read you the

8

statute; that I couldn't tell you which movies were and whic^i

9

movies weren't, that that was up to you?

JO

A

You are -- you are -- You are not telling me the

11

time.

12

thing is so long I don't understand.

13

You quoting from the City ordinance.

Q

The whole

I told you that that's the ordinance, that's the

14

requirement, and you have to abide by this.

15

to come and look at your movies and determine which ones

16

are and which ones aren't.

17

MR. BULLEN:

I'm not going

I don't know whether this is

18

objectionable or not, considering the posture of these two

19

people here.

20

Your Honor.

21

Q

But I think it ought to stop at some point,

(By Mr. Halls)

Mr. Kim Fai, did you have the

22

covers of these movies displayed?

23

regard to displaying covers of these movies?

24

A.

Urn, you mean this time?

25

Q

I mean all your movies.

What is your policy with
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1

speaks for itself with regard to what it contains and whethe

2

or not it is intended for some serious purpose or whether

3

it's intended to excite and do these other things sexually.

4

I don't think there can really be any question.

5

think we should muddy the waters by trying to determine

6

whether there's a constitutional problem here.

7

that Blanding City is going under is the same statute the

g

State has used and the same statute that has essentially

9

been upheld in State vs. Hague.

And I don't]

The statute

Now, that's the constitu-

10

tional issue, and it's already been decided.

11

the -- The situation we have before the Court is to apply

12

it.

13

be found pornographic?

14

entirely up to you.

Applying that statute, is there a —

15

So now that

Can these materialjs

Are they pornographic?

That's

I thank you.

THE COURT:

Mr. Halls, before you sit down,

16

let me ask you a couple of questions.

17

that the entrepreneur, then, cannot rely to any extent on

18

the rating?

19

MR. HALLS:

Is it your position

It would be my position, Your

20

Honor, that the entreprenuer is -- has a burden.

21

the entire burden of determining what he puts on the shelf.

22

There's no other way.

23

cute who put the rating on.

24
25

He has

Otherwise, we're going to go prose-

THE COURT:

Did you feel that when you dis-

cussed with Mr. Chan the initial May 5th incident that you
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made a grant of immunity to Mr. Chan so long as he monitored
the films in the future?
3 I
4

MR- HALLS:

No, I did not.

In fact, what

I indicated to him -- I indicated to him that on the two

5 J movies -- Well, this is by way of testimony, I guess, Your
6

Honor -- I indicated to him that on the two movies -- He

7

was in my office for the purpose of trying to work --

g I

THE COURT:

Yes, I understand that.

9

MR. HALLS:

(Continued) - - a n essential

10 J complaint that had been made against him.

And what I indi-

cated to him was we would hold, essentially in abeyance,
12 I and he agreed with me or told me that he would police himsel
13
14

And we took no action, but we didn't say that we wouldn't.
THE COURT:

And then when this incident when]

15

you found Exhibit No. 3 came to life, then you went back

16

and reactivated the original proposition against both Mr.

17

Chan and Mrs. Chan; is that

—

18

MR. HALLS:

That's correct.

19

THE COURT:

That's essentially it.

20

MR. HALLS:

There was no discussion with

21

regard to immunity or anything like that.

22

ing to reach a kind of agreement that we could both live

23

with and see if we couldn't handle the problem.

24
25

THE COURT:
on that occasion —

We were just try-j

Was there any discussion at tHatj-

and this may be improper, as far as
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1

testimony is concerned - but do you remember anything indi-

2

cated about whether or not he was going to monitor R-rated?

3

MR. HALLS:

My testimony, and Mr. Chan's

4

testimony, Your Honor, are somewhat different.

5

it is my recollection that when Mr. Chan came to talk to

6

me, he indicated to me that he -- and this is what I believe

7

I testified to -- he indicated to me that he already was

8

viewing these movies.

9

me that he was trying to handle the problem.

10

tion

It was m y —

He did that by way of assurance to
So, the situa-

—

jl

THE COURT:

I think that was your testimony.

12

MR. HALLS:

So the situation -- the situatiofi

13

that sticks in my mind is that Mr. Chan indicated that he

14

was already viewing the movies and that he would continue

15

to view the movies.

16

tion, that that was both the adult rated movies, and he had

And it's my impression, now my recollec]

17 I a number of other movies, rated R and other things; for
instance, the Playboy movies and so forth.

And he told me

19 I that when they had suggestive covers, that he viewed them
20

before he put them on the stand.

I believe that was my

21 j testimony, and he -THE COURT:

That was your testimony.

23 I

MR. HALLS:

And his testimony was contrary.

24

MR, BULLEN:

25

That wasn't his testimony. It

was his proffer, but it wasn't his testimony.

He did proffd

162

1

that if there's any distinction that can be made there.

2

MR. BULLEN:

I have to object to this whole-]

3

THE COURT:

My notes indicate that (inaudible)

4

Okay, Mr. Halls, that's all I have.

5

for the record.

6

Your objection is noted)

Will the Defendants please rise?

Mr, Kim Fai Chan,

7

I find you guilty of the offense of Distributing Pornographij

8

Materials on the charge due on June 15th.

9

guilty of the charge on May the 5th.

I find you not

Defendant, Sook Wah

10

Chan, I find you guilty of the charge of —

11

with Distribution of Pornographic Materials on May the 5th,

12

1986.

13
14

What do you say with regard to punishment or imposition of sentence, gentlemen?

15
16

charging you

MR. BULLEN:
correctly:

Did I understand the Court

you find Mr. Chan not guilty on May 5th?

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. BULLEN:

19

THE COURT:

That's correct.
And Mrs. Chan guilty?
Yes.

I couldn't find that the

20

State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that scienter

21

knowledge -- element for Mr. Chan.

22

for Mrs. Chan.

23

him, especially where there was a denial in the State's

24

witness.

25

Chan, Mr. Chan claimed to have no knowledge of the materials.

I think he proved it

I'm not willing to impute her knowledge to

Mr. Halliday indicated that when he approached Mr.l
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1

MR. BULLEN:

Well, I don't particularly want

2

to come back.

I don't know that I'm ready this minute to --|

3

I don't want to have to come back from Salt Lake.

4

THE COURT:

Do you want some time to discuss]

5

with your clients and/or Mr. Halls what punishment he's

6

going to recommend and/or --

7

MR. BULLEN:

8

MR. HALLS:

9

under the City ordinance?

Are you sentencing, Your Honor,
I guess that is the case, isn't

10

it —

U

was fined -- the fine was about $200.00, and there's a man-

12

datory jail sentence in that statute.

13

we don't have any -- I think it's like seven days.

14

I don't know how —

15

waive a mandatory sentence.

16

point I don't feel that the City would be served by taking

17

him away from —

18

or maybe we could do part public service, or something like

19

that.

20
21

is it not?

What do you recommend, Mr. Halljs?

Originally in the other case I think he

As far as that goes,
And,

whether really I have the authority to
We would definitely —

At this

or maybe they can serve that on weekends,

MR. BULLEN:

I would suggest that it could

be done by confinement at home.

22

MR. HALLS:

Well --

23

THE COURT:

May I see that portion of the ccjde?

24

MR. HALLS:

It would be my position, Your

25

Honor, that the City of Blanding would recommend whatever
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A T T O R N E Y A T LAW
7 3 S O U T H MAIN
BLANDING, UTAH 84511
(BOD

678-3333

November 6, 1986

Herschel Bullen
Attorney for Defendant
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Re; Discovery of Plaintiff's Case
Dear Herschel
In accordance with your request for discovery of our
records with regard to the Chin and Chan matters I have enclosed
various documents and reports. The one glaring omission to this
information is the Statement of Mike Daisy. Our Chief of Police
is on two weeks vacation in Kansas and has the statement as part
of his file. I will get it to you as soon as it is available to
me.
Since I have not heard from you on the date for the
trial I have set it for November 25th beginning at 10:00 a.m. at
the Blanding City Offices. If you have any Voir Dire questions
or wish to submit jury instructions please do so one week in
advance of the trial.
In answering your requests:
1.

None

2. There is no record in Blanding City other than the
current charges that I am aware of.
3.
enclosed
4.

Copies of the covers of the seized movies are
A. None
B. None
C. This question is left to local standards as
determined by the jury
D. See C. above
E. Movies not Rated
F. Mr. Kim Fai Chan was present in my office after
The confiscation of the movies and indicated
that he had viewed the movies contained in Count

G. Unknown
H. None
I. Attorney Steven Boos viewed "Confessions of a
Normal American Housewife" and made some of
these types of comments.
J. None
5.

Michael Dayzie
168 N. 400 W. Box 175
Blanding, Utah 84511
Tom Austin
142 N. 200 E. (11-4)
Blanding, Utah 84511
Mike Halliday
242 S. 200 W. (65-1)
Blanding, Utah 84511

6. A statement was given to the local radio station by
the police Chief after confiscation of the material.
The Manager of the station contacted me before running
the spot as news and I believe after my conversation
did not run the piece. I have not seen the text of the
material. I am aware that Mr. Chan went to the radio
station and got a copy of the statement.
I believe this letter will take care of the concerns you
expressed in your motion.
If you have any questions please
immediately advise.
Sin

